Sell‐Side Analyst Bias When Investment Banks Have Privileged Access to the Board
利用英国企业经纪业务实践开发了一种新的关联度衡量方法，研究投资银行与公司董事会的特权关系如何导致卖方分析师偏见，并验证了美国“全球和解”证据在英国同样适用。
Research on analyst bias typically identifies affiliation with reference to a subset of the mandates that could give rise to incentives for bias in a multifunction investment bank. This paper develops a new measure of affiliation based upon the UK practice of corporate broking. An advantage of this approach is that affiliation is no longer restricted to isolated equity issuance events as it is an ongoing activity. This research shows that prior US evidence regarding the “Global Settlement” is robust to this new measure and application in the United Kingdom rather than solely the United States. The paper uses a hazard rate methodology focusing on the timeliness of revisions to address selection bias concerns.