Technology Transfer, Licensing Contracts, and Incentives for Further Innovation
建立风险分担模型，分析技术许可中买卖双方的风险偏好和创新预期如何影响支付方式与本地创新激励，发现买方风险厌恶会降低固定支付和创新水平。
Abstract Technology licensing is common in agricultural and natural resource sectors. An important characteristic of technology licenses is that they provide incentives for further innovation on the part of the buyer. This paper develops a risk‐sharing model to analyze how risk preferences and expectations about further innovation possibilities alter technology payments and the incentives for complementary local innovation. Higher buyer risk aversion, which is associated with lower fixed payments, reduces the technology buyer's level of innovation. Sellers are generally better off when innovation is anticipated, but buyers are generally better off when innovation is unanticipated, although less innovation may be realized.