Does trust extend beyond the village? Experimental trust and social distance in Cameroon
利用喀麦隆农村的实验数据，量化社会距离对信任和利他行为的影响，发现同村人之间转移金额显著更高，且性别、教育和轮转信贷组织成员身份的影响至少与同村效应相当。
Abstract In this paper we use experimental data from rural Cameroon to quantify the effect of social distance on trust and altruism. Our measure of social distance is relevant to everyday economic interactions: subjects in a Trust Game play with fellow villagers or with someone from a different village. We find that significantly more money is sent when the players are from the same village. Other factors that influence transfers at least as much as the same-village effect are gender, education and membership of rotating credit groups. To test whether Senders are motivated by altruism, they also play a Triple Dictator Game. Senders transfer significantly more money on average in the Trust Game than in the Triple Dictator Game. However, there is also a social distance effect in the Triple Dictator Game. Results from a Risk Game suggest that Trust Game transfers are uncorrelated with attitudes to risk.