Investment timing, liquidity, and agency costs of debt
在连续时间框架下研究债务和流动性如何影响企业投资，发现股东与债权人冲突导致投资门槛随杠杆率呈U形、随流动性递减，并推导出消除代理成本的最优流动性水平。
This paper examines the effect of debt and liquidity on corporate investment in a continuous-time framework. We show that stockholder–bondholder agency conflicts cause investment thresholds to be U-shaped in leverage and decreasing in liquidity. In the absence of tax effects, we derive the optimal level of liquid funds that eliminates agency costs by implementing the first-best investment policy for a given capital structure. In a second step we generalize the framework by introducing a tax advantage of debt, and we show that an interior solution for liquidity and capital structure optimally trades off tax benefits and agency costs of debt.