Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
模型分析股东如何利用审计报告与掌握私人信息的经理签约，审计技术不完美导致审计师与经理可能合谋，发现提高经理惩罚会增加其贿赂审计师的动机，从而提升防合谋成本，并比较内部与外部审计的优劣。
In this model, shareholders can use auditors' reports to contract with a privately-informed manager. Imperfect audit technology allows the auditor and the manager to collude. Auditors are useful when they have good information and the manager's liability is high. Expected maximum deterrence is not desirable and production is suboptimal, even with unbounded punishments. Raising the manager's punishment raises the bribe he may offer the auditor, which raises the cost of preventing collusion. The authors also distinguish internal auditors (costless but collusive) from external ones (costly but not collusive) and show that the optimal contract may specify random external audits. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.