Les Liaisons dangereuses: a Minskyan approach to the relation of credit and investment in Argentina during the 1990s
利用明斯基的企业分类（对冲、投机、庞氏），基于阿根廷1992-2001年面板数据，发现短期财务受限的企业被迫依赖内部资金进行长期投资，信贷分配遵循借款人质量惯例而非项目质量。
We classify firms according to their financial behaviour in the short term using a Minskyan taxonomy that classifies firms as Hedge, Speculative and Ponzi. We measure financial constraints across that taxonomy using panel-data for Argentina during 1992--2001. After controlling for profitability we find that firms with an oppressed financial structure in the short term had to rely on their internal funds for long-term investment. We interpret this finding from a Minskyan/Keynesian framework arguing that credit allocation followed conventional rules about the quality of borrowers and not necessarily about the quality of the project. Because of being a highly unstable country, Argentinean firms' quality is defined on a short-term basis. Copyright The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved., Oxford University Press.