A Dynamic Theory of Conjectural Variations
用无限期调整成本模型证明，动态寡头竞争的稳态闭环均衡与静态猜想变分均衡一致；在线性需求和二次成本下，动态猜想为负、常数、对称，并随贴现率在静态一致猜想与零（古诺）之间连续变化。
This paper explores the relationship between dynamic oligopolistic competition and static conjectural variations equilibria. Using an infinite horizon adjustment cost model, the author demonstrates that any steady state closed-loop (subgame-perfect) equilibrium coincides with a conjectural variations equilibrium. In the case of linear demand and quadratic costs, the dynamic conjectures consistent with closed-loop steady state equilibria are negative, constant, symmetric, and vary continuously with the discount rate (and the adjustment cost parameter) in an interval between the static consistent conjectures and zero (Cournot). Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.