Efficiency and Disagreement in Repeated Infinite Horizon Bargaining Games
基于Satterthwaite和Williams的密封投标k-双拍卖模型，提出一种基于声誉的分歧理论，解释为何在存在继续谈判收益时，代理人仍可能在首轮后终止谈判。
M. Satterthwaite and S. Williams (1987) characterize regular equilibria of the sealed bid k-double auction that, in some cases, are efficient. The sealed bid k-double auction specifies one period of simultaneous offers and requires agents to sometimes disagree at the end of the first period when gains from continued bargaining exist. This paper constructs a theory of disagreement based on reputation in repeated bargaining games. Agents make the offers of a Satterthwaite-Williams regular equilibrium in the first round of a negotiation. Then, if no trade results, the agents terminate the negotiation in spite of possible gains from the option of continued bargaining. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.