Two Models of the Auditor ‐ Client Interaction: Tests with United Kingdom Data*
用英国数据检验了审计师与经理互动的两种模型：博弈论模型（审计师主动影响经理报告）和决策论模型（审计师被动接受报告）。结果支持博弈论模型，首次用档案数据验证了该模型。
Abstract. Accounting research contains two distinct approaches to the interaction between accounting management and the independent auditor. Game theory suggests that the auditor's testing strategy will affect the manager's reporting strategy and that the two strategies form an equilibrium. The game‐theoretic approach views the auditor as active, in that the auditor acknowledges the effect that his or her testing strategy has on the manager's reporting. In contrast, in the decision‐theoretic approach, the auditor tests reports, but ignores the effect that such testing might have on the manager's reporting behavior. Essentially, the decision‐theoretic approach views the auditor as passive, taking the reporting strategy as given when designing tests. We use United Kingdom data to estimate both models and test their validity using nested hypothesis tests. Our results demonstrate that the active, game‐theoretic model better describes the auditor‐manager interaction. This is the first empirical validation of the game‐theoretic model using archival accounting data.