Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games
提出三种精炼无限标准式博弈中完美均衡和适当均衡的方法，分别基于强颤抖、弱颤抖和有限博弈极限，其中强颤抖方法最尊重无限博弈结构。
We present three distinct approaches to perfect and proper equilibria for infinite normal form games. In the first two approaches, players tremble in the infinite games playing full support approximate best responses to others' strategies. In the strong approach, a tremble assigns high probability to the set of pure best responses ; in the weak approach, it assigns high probability to a neighborhood of this set. The third, limit-of-finite approach applies traditional refinements to sequences of successively larger finite games. Overall, the strong approach to equilibrium refinement most fully respects the structure of infinite games.