Pork-Barrel Politics, Targetable Policies, and Fiscal Federalism
用一个再分配政治模型分析税收/转移支付和地方项目在不同可瞄准程度下的效率问题，发现政策可瞄准性增强会加剧政党竞争，反而提高地方项目供给效率。
This article utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with jurisdictional specific local projects to analyze the inefficiencies that arise under differing levels of targetability in both taxes/transfers and local projects. The ability to tactically target taxes/transfers and/or local projects leads political parties to engage in pandering to favored groups. However, in equilibrium, we find that greater targetability in the set of available policies actually intensifies the competition between the political parties and so increases efficiency in the provision of local projects.