Central Wage Setting under Multiple Technological Equilibria: A Mechanism for Equilibrium Elimination
研究了在最终分散工资谈判前先进行一轮中央工资设定如何可能提高就业，通过一个存在战略互补性的多重均衡模型，说明中央工资设定通过约束低技术企业，推动经济向高技术均衡转变。
Instituting an initial round of centralized wage setting before an ultimate round of decentralized wage bargaining may actually raise employment. A general multi–equilibrium model is set up with strategic complementarities in the implementation of a new technology through aggregate demand spillovers. In this model, centralized wage setting to establish an outside option wage, which is selectively binding on lo–tech firms, may achieve the “big push” to a hi–tech general equilibrium with higher employment, output, wages and profits.