Hierarchical thinking and learning in rank order contests
研究了一种协调博弈，其中第K个提交者获胜，通过实验发现K值影响初始提交和收敛到均衡的行为，并用分层思维和方向学习解释这些模式。
Abstract We analyze a class of coordination games in which the K th player to submit an entry wins a contest. These games have an infinite number of symmetric equilibria and the set of equilibria does not change with K . We run experiments with 15 participants and with K = 3, 7, and 11. Our experiments show that the value of K affects initial submissions and convergence to equilibrium. When K is small relative to the number of participants, our experiments show that repeated play converges to or near zero. When K is large, an equilibrium is often not reached as a result of repeated play. We seek explanations to these patterns in hierarchical thinking and direction learning.