Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective
探讨在晋升或离职合同环境下，企业保留员工的决定如何向其他潜在雇主传递员工生产率的信号，并分析这种合同如何激励员工积累通用人力资本。
A firm will typically gather information concerning its own workers that is not available to other potential employers, while other firms will attempt to reduce this information asymmetry by observing the actions of the initial employer. The author argues that this process can be important in environments characterized by up-or-out contracts in that the retentions decision can serve as a signal of productivity. The article investigates this argument in an environment where in-or-out contracts are employed because they provide workers with an incentive to accumulate general human capital and where learning takes place in a diffuse fashion. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.