A comparison of first price multi-object auctions
比较了同时升价拍卖和第一价格密封投标拍卖在多物品私人价值环境下的表现，发现软截止的升价拍卖效率最高，密封投标拍卖收入最高，硬截止的升价拍卖因大量晚投标导致收入和效率最低。
Abstract We compare simultaneous multi-object English-type ascending price auctions with first price sealed bid auctions in private values environments with multiobject demands. Special attention is paid to the effect of closing rules on ascending auctions’ outcomes. We find that simultaneous ascending auctions with the soft closing rule are the most efficient, while the sealed bid auctions generate the highest revenue. Ascending auctions with the hard closing rule display a significant amount of late bidding, resulting in the lowest among the three institutions revenue and efficiency.