The Economics of Reentry Regulation of Pesticides
研究农药再进入规制（即限制施药后人员进入农田的时间）的经济学逻辑，发现该政策会激励农民提前施药，并在减少工人中毒与降低农民收入之间产生显著权衡，且因地制宜的规制优于统一标准。
Abstract Government agencies frequently try to protect the public from industrial hazards by separating the two in time and/or space. This paper develops a methodology for one such policy, reentry regulation of pesticides. Re‐entry regulation is shown to provide a rational incentive for preventive applications of pesticides, a practice usually attributed to risk aversion or inadequate information. The tradeoffs between farm worker poisonings and lost grower revenue are shown to be substantial. Weather‐dependent, location‐specific reentry regulation appears superior to the uniform regulation now in effect.