Earnings Management and Antitrust Investigations: Political Costs Over Business Cycles
研究受反垄断调查的企业如何根据商业周期调整盈余管理，在经济扩张期通过减少利润的应计项目来降低政治成本，而在衰退期则不这么做。
This paper examines evidence of earnings management pertaining to regulatory‐imposed wealth transfers (i.e., political costs) over business cycles. The sample consists of firms subject to merger‐related antitrust investigation under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Industrial organization literature, together with the political cost hypothesis, suggests that these firms’ earnings management incentives may vary over national business cycles. Our results indicate that investigated firms do indeed choose income‐decreasing discretionary accruals during expansions but not during recessions, in order to reduce the political costs associated with Clayton Act cases.