National targeting policies, high-technology industries, and excessive competition
探讨国家干预政策如何在高技术产业中引发过度竞争，分析其发生条件与表现，并为政治经济学理论和贸易政策辩论提供研究机会。
This paper explores some fundamental changes in market dynamics that are unfolding in the new competitive landscape as a result of aggressive industrial intervention by nation'states. The thesis is that national targeting policies are likely, under identifiable conditions, to cause rivalry in high-technology industries to become excessively competitive, strictly defined in terms of producer welfare. The paper analyzes why this is likely to occur in high-technology sectors rather than in other types of industries, and how excessive competition is likely to be manifested in specific dimensions of competitive rivalry. The paper also discusses research opportunities for further development of a theory of the political economy of excessive competition and for strategy scholars to make new contributions to trade policy debates.