Tolerance for Ambiguity, Risk Preference, and Negotiator Effectiveness
实验发现谈判者的风险偏好和模糊容忍度共同影响其有效性，且双方风险偏好的匹配程度会调节这种影响。
It is a commonly accepted belief in both the axiomatic and noncooperative game literatures that negotiators' risk preferences affect bargaining outcomes [28] [33]. However, there is little systematic empirical evidence to support this conclusion and virtually nothing on the moderating effect of one negotiator's risk preference on the other negotiator in a dyad. Further, bargaining models are typically based on Subjective Expected Utility theory, which provides no scope for incorporating the decision maker's tolerance for ambiguity. An experiment was conducted to test specific hypotheses on the effect of risk preference and tolerance for ambiguity on negotiator effectiveness. The risk preference of the negotiators was experimentally induced while their tolerance for ambiguity was measured. The results indicate that negotiator effectiveness increases as the negotiator's preference for risk increases, though this increase is mitigated by the risk preference of the dyadic partner. Further, when the negotiators in a dyad are matched on risk preference, the negotiator with a greater tolerance for ambiguity is more effective. However, when the negotiators are not matched on risk preference, their attitude towards ambiguity moderates the effect of risk preference. These results suggest that bargaining models need to include both risk preference and tolerance for ambiguity to expand their descriptive power.