Share tenancy as strategic delegation
提出分成租佃的新解释：在村庄中少数地主竞争雇佣劳动力时，分成租佃是一种战略委托形式，地主通过给予分成佃农适当激励获得额外收益。
The paper develops a new explanation of sharecropping based on the idea of an incentive equilibrium. It considers a set-up in which a few landlords in a village confront the choice of cultivating their farms by adopting different tenurial arrangements, ranging from owner operation, through the fixed-rental system to sharecropping. These landlords are the only sources of employment in the village, and compete in the wages they pay to their workers. In such an environment sharecropping is explained as a form of strategic delegation where a landlord gets extra benefit by having a share tenant and giving him suitable incentives.