COMPETITIVE PRICING AND EFFICIENCY IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*
整合并推广了搜索均衡中价格决定与效率的结论，证明当折现率和搜索成本趋近于零时，所有交易价格趋同于竞争性市场出清价格，并探讨了正搜索成本下效率实现的条件。
We consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium. Extending models by Rubinstein and Wolinsky and by Gale, heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition. When the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0, we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive, market clearing, price. Given positive search costs, efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies Hosios' condition and r =0. When prices are set by third‐party market makers, however, we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient.