Horizontal Mergers in Spatially Differentiated Noncooperative Markets
构建了空间价格歧视下企业横向合并的Cournot-Nash模型，可估算合并后均衡交货价格的涨幅，为反垄断评估提供新方法。
The authors present a Cournot-Nash model of horizontal mergers between firms that engage in spatial price discrimination. The model extends the analysis of such mergers as presented in the U.S. Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines. Rather than conclude the evaluation of such a merger with an estimate of the postmerger Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, as is done in the Merger Guidelines, the authors' model yields an estimate of the increases in the equilibrium, postmerger delivered.prices caused by the merger. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.