Advertising and Coordination
当价格等信息难以传递时，消费者和企业可能无法利用规模经济，导致协调失败。本文证明看似无信息的广告支出可通过暗示低价来消除协调失败，为广告与低价、大规模的经验关联提供理论解释，并应用于亏本销售定价。
When market information such as price is difficult to communicate, consumers and firms may be unable to take advantage of mutually beneficial scale economies, so that coordination failures arise. Ostensibly uninformative advertising expenditures can be used to eliminate coordination failures, by allowing an efficient firm to communicate implicitly that it offers a low price. This provides a theoretical explanation for Benham's (1972) empirical association of the ability to advertise with lower prices and larger scale. Advertising becomes necessary for optimal coordination when the identity of the efficient firm is uncertain. An application to loss-leader pricing is developed.