Frequentist Probability and Choice under Uncertainty
探讨在频率主义概率框架下构建期望效用理论的不可能性，聚焦约翰·维恩和弗朗西斯·埃奇沃思的观点，指出概率值无法严格应用于单一事件，并通过圣彼得堡悖论加以说明。
The paper is concerned with the question of the impossibility of a theory of expected utility within the context of a frequentist theory of probability. In so doing I focus on John Venn's and Francis Y. Edgeworth's work. Both authors underline that the strong division between probability and theory of decision derives from the impossibility to apply cogently probability values to single events. According to the author, this question is exemplified in reference to St. Petersburg paradox. The results of the work suggest that the applicability of the theory of probability to choice under uncertainty depend by semantical characterization of probability. Finally the author maintain a possible interpretation of the historical development of the expected utility model that contrast with the consolidated view.