Experimental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem
通过实验检验科斯定理的行为相关性，即在零交易成本下，外部性水平是否不受初始产权分配影响，并验证双方自利行为能否达成帕累托最优。
THE Coase Theorem is a theoretical proposition describing the outcomes of mutually advantageous bargains in the face of the generation of an externality. The traditional Coasian framework is summarized in the set of assumptions adopted by Hoffman and Spitzer in their behavioral evaluation of the Theorem: "(a) two agents to each externality (and bargain), (b) perfect knowledge of one another's (convex) production and profit or utility functions, (c) competitive markets, (d) zero transactions costs, (e) costless court system, (f) profit-maximizing producers and expected utility-maximizing consumers, (g) no wealth effects, (h) agents will strike mutually advantageous bargains in the absence of transactions costs."' The Coase Theorem is generally stated in terms of the neutrality of the resulting level of the externality to the initial assignment of property rights between the two parties. That is, irrespective of which party has the unilateral property right (UPR) to impose the externality on the other party, we should find the Pareto-optimal level of externality generation. The compelling feature of this Coasian result is that it is brought about by the self-interest of each party and does not rely on their altruism with respect to one another or the visible hand of the state. In an important study, Hoffman and Spitzer provide an experimental evaluation of the behavioral relevance of the Coase Theorem.2 They claim * We are grateful to the Centre for Economic Analysis of Property Rights for financial