平行进口与价格管制

Parallel Imports and Price Controls

RAND Journal of Economics · 2006
被引 9
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

挑战传统观点,认为允许平行进口(国际知识产权权利用尽)反而可能比禁止时更快促进创新,因为贸易伙伴国在允许平行进口时会调整其价格管制政策。

Abstract

Price controls create opportunities for international arbitrage. Many have argued that such arbitrage, if tolerated, will undermine intellectual property rights and dull the incentives for investment in research‐intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals. We challenge this orthodox view and show, to the contrary, that the pace of innovation often is faster in a world with international exhaustion of intellectual property rights than in one with national exhaustion. The key to our conclusion is to recognize that governments will make different choices of price controls when parallel imports are allowed by their trade partners than they will when they are not.

平行进口价格管制知识产权创新激励