Bargaining in Stationary Networks
研究了在固定网络中随机配对的玩家进行无限期讨价还价博弈，所有均衡支付等价，并提出了新概念来刻画网络位置的优势，最终给出极限均衡支付的计算方法。
We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient. Several new concepts—mutually estranged sets, partners, and shortage ratios—provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network. We develop a procedure to determine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players. Characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained.