The Bargaining Positions of the Parties to a Lease Agreement
研究出租人与承租人税率不同时，双方都能接受的租赁协议存在的条件，并分析双方的谈判地位。
great deal of attention in the literature in recent years. As a number of authors, such as Miller and Upton [6], Lewellen, Long and McConnell [4], Myers, Dill and Bautista [8], and Franks and Hodges [3] have pointed out, in situations where the lessee and lessor are in different tax positions it is sometimes possible to devise lease agreements that are attractive to both parties. This paper develops conditions for such agreements to exist and explores the bargaining positions of the two parties. When the lessor pays tax at a higher marginal rate than the lessee, the benefit he obtains from the tax depreciation allowances is greater than that which would be obtained by the lessee. From this it is sometimes assumed that mutually attractive lease agreements must always exist when the lessor is a higher marginal rate taxpayer than the lessee. This is not true, as was pointed out by Miller and Upton [6]. Although transferring tax depreciation allowances from a lessee to a more highly taxed lessor reduces the total tax paid by the two parties, the lease payments themselves have p ecisely the opposite effect. As will be shown in this paper, it can in some circumstances be advantageous for a low rate taxpayer (or a temporary non-taxpayer) to lease equipment to a high rate taxpayer. When mutually attractive lease contracts do exist, the lessor and lessee must bargain to reach agreement. Interestingly, the bargaining process is not one of dividing a fixed total benefit between the two parties. The size of the total benefit depends on the lease agreement that is negotiated. The value to the lessor of increasing the annual lease payments by $1 is not, in general, equal to the cost to the lessee of doing this. This paper first reviews the theory of lease evaluation and uses the results in Myers, Dill and Bautista [8] to develop sufficient conditions for the existence of mutually attractive lease agreements when the lessee and lessor are, either temporarily or permanently, subject to different tax rates. The bargaining positions of the two parties is then discussed both from a game theoretic and a macroeconomic point of view.