The Impact of the Threat of Bankruptcy on the Structure of Compensation
构建并检验了企业破产概率影响其提供延迟薪酬方案倾向的模型，利用1983年当前人口调查数据发现，较低破产率提高了非工会制造业工人获得养老金的比例，且高破产率行业会陡峭化工龄-收入曲线。
This article builds and tests a model of the impact of a firm's bankruptcy probability on its propensity to offer deferred compensation schemes. Using 1983 Current Population Survey data, the authors find that, ceteris paribus, lower failure rates raise the incidence of pensions for nonunion workers outside manufacturing. Further, they find some evidence that, among those workers with a pension, a higher industry failure rate steepens tenure-earnings profiles (jointly controlling for union-nonunion and pension-no pension selectivity.) Such a result suggests that workers discount implicit promises of future earnings increases by the likelihood that the firm will not survive. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.