Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts
从描述环境和行为的成本出发，内生地构建合同不完全性模型，分析最优合同中自由裁量权与刚性的决定因素，并预测外生参数变化对不完全程度和形式的影响。
In this paper we model contract incompleteness “from the ground up,” as arising endogenously from the costs of describing the environment and the parties' behavior. Optimal contracts may exhibit two forms of incompleteness: discretion, meaning that the contract does not specify the parties' behavior with sufficient detail; and rigidity, meaning that the parties' obligations are not sufficiently contingent on the external state. The model sheds light on the determinants of rigidity and discretion in contracts, and yields rich predictions regarding the impact of changes in the exogenous parameters on the degree and form of contract incompleteness.