解释离职现象的隐性劳动契约

Implicit Labor Contracts to Explain Turnover

Journal of Labor Economics · 1986
被引 4
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

构建了一个信息不对称下的次优工资契约模型,其中流动性成本低的“好”工人因工资低于边际产出而离职,结合总冲击解释了离职率的顺周期性。

Abstract

Aggregate data exhibit procyclical movement in the rate of turnover. However, existing models of turnover have been unable to explain this phenomenon. In this model the author generates turnover as an outcome of a second-best wage contract when there is asymmetry of information about workers' mobility costs. A wage contract that insures the "bad" ("unlucky") workers results in "good" ("lucky") workers earning less than their marginal productivity. Therefore, good workers with low mobility costs leave the firm for the spot market wage. This, combined with an aggregate shock, results in a procyclical rate of turnover. Copyright 1986 by University of Chicago Press.

隐性劳动合同劳动力流动周期性波动信息不对称