Transition costs in secessions, with a brief application to Scotland
论证了地区独立过程中产生的转型成本可能超过长期物质收益，分析了合作与否对成本的影响，并简要应用于苏格兰独立辩论。
This article demonstrates that the costs incurred in the process of a region becoming a sovereign state can be large enough to outweigh the long-term material benefits of independence. Transition costs consist of transaction costs, fiscal costs, and the cost of uncertainty. Their size depends crucially on whether the politics of the transition are cooperative. Game theory, however, shows that there are incentives for threats of non-cooperation and for the exercise of such threats. These considerations are applied, briefly, to the debate about Scottish independence. This includes a short analysis of how transition costs can be reduced. A final section inquires about possible transition benefits, which can consist of solidarity.