The Effect of Disability Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply
利用法官对残疾保险案件的随机分配，发现领取福利使劳动参与率三年后下降26个百分点，但对老年人、大学毕业生和精神疾病患者影响较小。
This paper exploits the effectively random assignment of judges to Disability Insurance cases to estimate the causal impact of Disability Insurance receipt on labor supply. We find that benefit receipt reduces labor force participation by 26 percentage points three years after a disability determination decision, although the reduction is smaller for older people, college graduates, and those with mental illness. OLS and instrumental variables estimates are similar. Furthermore, over 60 percent of those denied benefits by an administrative law judge are subsequently allowed benefits within ten years, showing that most applicants apply, reapply, and appeal until they get benefits.