Coal Rates and Revenue Adequacy in a Quasi-Regulated Rail Industry
利用1974-1986年美国一级铁路面板数据，通过超越对数成本函数分析发现，规模报酬足够大，若煤炭托运人承担全部收入负担，煤炭运价将升至社会不可接受的水平；即使非煤炭运输分摊部分间接费用，煤炭运输的收入负担仍然很大，所需的运价上涨在政治和经济上可能都不可行。
This article considers whether equitable rates to captive coal shippers are compatible with competitive rates of return in the rail industry. Using the results of a translog cost function based on panel data of Class I railroads for 1974-1986, I show that returns to scale are sufficiently large to cause coal rates to rise to socially unacceptable levels if coal shippers have to bear the entire revenue burden. Moreover, even if noncoal traffic makes a contribution to overhead, the revenue burden on coal traffic is still substantial and would require increases in coal rates that are probably neither politically nor economically feasible.