Corporate tournaments and executive compensation: Evidence from the U.K.
基于1990年代末100家英国上市公司500多名高管的数据，检验锦标赛理论，发现高管薪酬与层级呈凸关系，CEO与其他高管薪酬差距与参赛人数正相关，但薪酬差距对公司业绩影响不大。
Abstract This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.