Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
利用巴西地方政府的审计报告衡量政治腐败，发现连任制度能显著减少市长腐败行为，尤其在信息不透明和司法惩罚概率低的地区效果更明显。
We show that political institutions affect corruption levels. We use audit reports in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior.