ON FINANCE AS A THEORY OF TFP, CROSS‐INDUSTRY PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES, AND ECONOMIC RENTS*
构建了一个资本市场不完善的理论，研究契约执行能力如何影响不同生产率的企业家之间的资源配置，以及不同外部融资需求行业间的资源分配，并得到实证支持。
We develop a theory of capital‐market imperfections to study how the ability to enforce contracts affects resource allocation across entrepreneurs of different productivities, and across industries with different needs for external financing. The theory implies that countries with a poor ability to enforce contracts are characterized by the use of inefficient technologies, low aggregate TFP, large differences in labor productivity across industries, and large employment shares in industries with low productivity. These implications are supported by the empirical evidence. The theory also suggests that entrepreneurs have a vested interest in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement.