Bilateral Trading as an Efficient Auction over Time
建模了不完全信息下的双边交易市场，发现当潜在交易足够同质时，资源分配能达到效率，类似于同质竞拍者的第一价格拍卖。
A market composed of pairwise trading under incomplete information is modeled in order to analyze how resources are allocated among competing uses when information about trade gains is incomplete. Contrary to the results from studying a single such trade, sufficient homogeneity across potential trades guarantees that efficiency obtains. This is analogous to simple first-price auctions with homogeneous bidders, where bidders have a common bid function and, as a result, the high bidder also places the highest value on the auctioned object. With enough symmetry, the decentralized bilateral trades in the present model occur as if they were made in a first-price auction that occurs through time. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.