Inducing Efficiency: Externalities, Missing Markets, and the Coase Theorem
用双矩阵博弈模型研究科斯定理中旁支付能否带来效率结果，发现当只有一个市场缺失时诱导均衡存在且帕累托有效，多个市场缺失时可能无效。
The capacity of side-payments to induce an efficient outcome, as predicted by the Coase theorem, is studied. Side-payments are formally introduced in a bimatrix game involving externalities and the resulting equilibrium is called.an induced equilibrium. When induced equilibria exist, they weakly Pareto-dominate a Nash equilibrium of the original game without side-payments. When, because of externalities, one market is missing, an induced equilibrium always exists, is uniquely valued, and is Pareto-efficient. When more than one market is missing, induced equilibria may not exist, may be Pareto-inefficient, and may be Pareto ranked. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.