Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions
研究了生产者保护立法赋予种植者在合同提前终止时索赔的权利，分析了在合同摩擦存在与否的情况下，该立法对效率和分配的影响，并澄清了其降低效率的条件。
Abstract This study models producer protection legislation (PPL) that would grant growers the right to claim damages if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, producer protection legislation damages (PPLD) would not be distortionary or redistributive. If contracting frictions exist, then PPLD would have efficiency and redistributive effects, though the direction and magnitude depends on the size of PPL damages vis‐à‐vis expected damages under existing contract law. This study clarifies the conditions under which PPLD would decrease efficiency and protect growers.