医疗过失责任

Liability for Medical Malpractice

Journal of Economic Perspectives · 1991
被引 103
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

用简单模型预测过失责任规则应能完全遏制医疗过失,但现实却严重偏离;进而探讨系统失灵的原因,并评估其成本与收益是否值得。

Abstract

Physicians and other medical providers are subject to a negligence rule of liability. In a simple model, with perfect information and homogeneous physicians, a negligence rule of liability with an appropriately defined due care standard should induce complete compliance: there should be no malpractice, no malpractice claims, and no demand for malpractice insurance. The malpractice experience is seriously at odds with this prediction. First, what goes wrong? Second, if the system does indeed operate imperfectly, does it yield benefits in terms of injuries deterred that outweigh the high overhead costs of operating a liability system?

医疗过失过失责任注意标准责任制度效率