CEO Compensation in Private Family Firms
基于529家美国私人家族企业样本，研究发现绩效薪酬在私人家族企业中同样重要，且所有权集中度和控制人阶段会增强这种关系，非家族CEO的薪酬绩效敏感性略高于家族CEO。
Although classical agency theorists claim that pay-for-performance is not relevant in the context of private family firms, the authors provide empirical evidence of the opposite, using a sample of 529 privately held U.S. family firms. The results suggest that objective performance-based measures play a significant role in CEO compensation. Additionally, the authors find that in private family firms CEO compensation is more responsive to firm performance in firms with low ownership dispersion and in the controlling-owner stage. Furthermore, the positive pay-for-performance relation is slightly stronger for nonfamily CEOs than for family CEOs.