Asset Revaluation Regulation with Multiple Information Sources
研究监管者如何设计资产重估政策，通过强制公允价值披露缓解资产转售市场的逆向选择问题，发现单一强制披露优于强制加自愿双信息源。
ABSTRACT: We examine the design of asset revaluation policies in settings where a regulator can mandate fair value disclosure in order to mitigate a lemons problem in the asset resale market. The welfare-maximizing policy generally prescribes fair value certification for the lower asset values and (less costly) historical cost reporting for the higher asset values. The potential for voluntary certification can reduce welfare by increasing equilibrium certification costs and promoting underinvestment in socially valuable projects. Thus, a single regulated source of information (mandated disclosure) can be preferable to two sources of information (mandated and voluntary disclosure).