Inefficient sales delays by a durable‐good monopoly facing a finite number of buyers
研究了有限买家下耐用品垄断企业的多均衡模型，发现存在一种买家间消耗战导致的销售延迟和未计划降价现象。
Abstract This article offers a new explanation for unscheduled price cuts and slow adoption of durable goods. We study a standard durable‐good monopoly model with a finite number of buyers and show that this game can have multiple subgame perfect equilibria in addition to the Pacman outcome—including the Coase conjecture. Of particular interest is a class of equilibria where the seller first charges a high price and only lowers that price once some—but not all—high‐valuation buyers purchase. This price structure creates a war of attrition between those buyers, which delays market clearing and rationalizes unscheduled purchase and price cut dates.