Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach
构建了一个和解选择的实证模型，检验理论文献中强调的风险偏好、诉讼成本和审判赔偿分布等变量是否能有效解释和解的发生及其金额，基于民事案件样本提供了法律系统如何影响当事人和解行为的新证据。
Litigants in civil lawsuits involving monetary damages often find an out-of-court settlement preferable to a trial. Most theoretical models of settlement choice employ an expected-utility-maximizing framework that emphasizes the importance of risk preferences, litigation costs, and the distribution of trial awards. An empirical model of settlement choice is used to examine whether the variables prominent in the theoretical literature are statistically useful in explaining the occurrence and monetary value of settlements. Estimates from a sample of civil filings provide new empirical evidence of how the legal system affects the behavior of litigants during the settlement process. Copyright 1989 by MIT Press.