Razorbacks, Ticky Cows, and the Closing of the Georgia Open Range: The Dynamics of Institutional Change Uncovered
通过分析19世纪末佐治亚州关闭开放牧场的历史案例，解释为何有潜在收益的制度会被延迟采用，而低效制度却持续存在，揭示了分配冲突和高交易成本如何阻碍自愿协议达成，以及立法机构在推动政策采纳中的作用。
This article attempts to explain why the adoption of potentially productive institutions is delayed and why inefficient ones persist by exploring the dynamics of institutional change in a particular historical case—the closing of the Georgia open range in the late nineteenth century. A closed range policy would have generated net benefits for specific regions of Georgia, but distributional conflicts, coupled with high transaction costs, made a voluntary agreement to do that unattainable. The article describes the Georgia legislature's important role in facilitating the adoption of a policy that led to more rapid agricultural development in the postbellum period.