When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action
研究需要团队合作的公共品生产博弈，通过量化反应策略更新分析长期均衡，揭示成功团队的条件，并说明增加一个“坏苹果”如何破坏合作，为限制参与者范围提供理论依据。
This paper studies collective-action games in which the production of a public good requires teamwork. A leading example is a threshold game in which provision requires the voluntary participation of m out of n players. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team successfully provides, and an equilibrium in which the collective action fails. A full characterization of long-run play reveals the determinants of success; these include the correlation between players' costs of provision and their valuations for the good. The addition of an extra "bad apple" player can "spoil the barrel" by destabilizing successful teams and so offers a rationale for limiting the pool of possible contributors. Copyright 2008, Wiley-Blackwell.