Project Assignment Rights and Incentives for Eliciting Ideas
研究委托人与两个代理人之间因对实物期权（等待时机）估值不同而产生的激励问题，发现代理人会因高估等待价值而隐瞒创意，而将分配权下放给一个代理人可降低另一代理人的等待价值，促使其披露创意。
In this paper, we study an incentive problem that arises between a principal and two agents because they value a real option differently. The real option in our model is a timing option. The agents have limited capacity to undertake projects, and each agent's capacity can be filled now or later. Because the principal cares about capacity in the aggregate but each agent cares only about his own capacity, the agents assign a higher value to the option to wait. As a result, agents sometimes withhold ideas from the principal. We show that decentralization can be a solution to this problem. Delegating assignment rights to an agent reduces the option value of waiting for the other agent sufficiently that he is willing to reveal his ideas.