A Comparison of Multiple‐Unit All‐Pay and Winner‐Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information*
通过23组实验，比较了多单位独立私有价值全支付拍卖与赢家支付拍卖的出价行为、效率和收益，发现两者收益等价且均高于风险中性贝叶斯均衡，但赢家支付拍卖更可能实现帕累托有效配置。
This article examines the properties of independent‐private‐value all‐pay and winner‐pay auctions when there are multiple units sold. We study bidding behavior, efficiency, and revenue in a set of 23 experimental sessions. Our data show that the all‐pay auction and the winner‐pay auction are empirically revenue equivalent, though both yield higher revenue than the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium. Our evidence also suggests that the winner‐pay auction is more likely to lead to a Pareto‐efficient allocation than the all‐pay auction.