Extraordinary Antitakeover Provisions and Insider Ownership Structure: The Case of Converting Savings and Loans
利用储蓄贷款协会转制为股份公司的数据，研究内部人所有权与反收购条款的相互决定关系，发现低所有权水平下两者负相关，高所有权水平下无关，支持内部人固守假说。
Insider ownership and antitakeover provisions both affect a firm's vulnerability to takeover, its value, and its managers' incentives and utility. We examine the simultaneous determi? nation of insider ownership and takeover protection using data from mutual savings and loan associations converting to stock form. At low levels of insider ownership, we find that ownership is negatively related to the number of extraordinary antitakeover provisions; at higher levels, ownership is not related to the number of antitakeover provisions. These results are consistent with insider entrenchment.